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Abstract  Fuel and leasable minerals mined in the United States have historically 
been subject to federal royalties while locatable minerals have not.  In recent years there 
have been multiple attempts to alter this policy and subject locatable minerals to federal 
royalties as well; most recently the preliminary 2011 Obama budget included a gross 
royalty on hard-rock mining on public lands.  This paper analyzes the issue of imposing 
such federal royalties from both a legal and economic perspective.  From a legal 
perspective, it is argued that the state of western property rights precludes royalties on 
currently extant claims so revenues from a royalty would not be realized for many years.  
From an economic perspective, it is argued that the effect on revenue would be smaller 
than one might anticipate due to such a royalty crowding out state levies or encouraging 
vertical disintegration on the part of mining firms to avoid much of the burden of the 
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Fuel and leasable minerals mined in the United States have historically been subject to 
federal royalties while locatable minerals have not.  In recent years there have been 
multiple attempts to alter this policy and subject locatable minerals to federal royalties as 
well; most recently the preliminary 2011 Obama budget included a gross royalty on hard-
rock mining on public lands.  This paper analyzes the issue of imposing such federal 
royalties from both a legal and economic perspective.  From a legal perspective, it is 
argued that the state of western property rights precludes royalties on currently extant 
claims so revenues from a royalty would not be realized for many years.  From an 
economic perspective, it is argued that the effect on revenue would be smaller than one 
might anticipate due to such a royalty crowding out state levies or encouraging vertical 
disintegration on the part of mining firms to avoid much of the burden of the royalty.   
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  Reform of the “1872 Mining Law,” which forms the basis of the General Mining Law,
1 
has been something of a “Holy Grail” for various groups for several decades.  These groups 
range from environmentalists to fiscal conservatives who argue that the 1872 Mining Law results 
in mines operating on federal lands receiving preferential treatment over other interests and 
paying too little in taxes and royalties.  Former Solicitor General for the Department of Interior 
John Leshy’s book “The Mining Law: A Study in Perpetual Motion”
2 recounts the story of 
attempts in the 1970s to reform the law and, to some extent, lays the groundwork for the reform 
efforts beginning in the 1990s and continuing to the present.  More recently, the issue of mining 
reform returned in the 2009 session of Congres; H.R. 3362, sponsored by Rep. Nick Rahall of 
West Virginia (who also sponsored reform efforts in the 1990s), largely repeats the 1990s reform 
effort.  Additionally, early versions of Obama’s proposed 2011 federal budget contained 
provisions for the imposition of new federal mining royalties on mines currently subject to the 
1872 Mining Law. 
  The 1872 Mining Law has been criticized for a number of “flaws,” which can be sorted 
into two broad categories.  First are arguments that the 1872 Mining Law gives primacy to 
mining operations and largely ignores other concerns such as environmental protection.  The 
second category is fiscal; the primary concern here is that the 1872 Mining Law contains no 
provisions for federal royalties on minerals mined from federally owned lands, leading to what is 
                                                 
1  U.S.C. §§ 22 – 24, 26 – 30, 33 – 35, 37, 39 – 43, 47 (2000). 
2 John D. Leshy, The Mining Law: A Study in Perpetual Motion, Resources for the Future, 1987.  John L. Dobra  
Reform of the 1872 Mining Law: A Primer, in Terry L. Anderson, ed., Multiple Conflicts over Multiple Uses, 
Political Economy Research Center, Bozeman, MT, 1994. describes the 1990’s reform efforts.  Andrew P. Morriss, 
Roger E. Meiners, and Andrew Dorchak, Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free Access Under the General Mining 
Law of 1872, Environmental Law, V. 34, No. 3, 2004, pp. 745 – 807, provides a more recent description of the 
ongoing saga.  
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perceived both as foregone revenues as well as differential treatment of mining among states, 
potentially causing a “race to the bottom.”
3  This argument is bolstered by the “common sense” 
notion that because deposits on privately owned land accrue royalties to the owners of the land, 
deposits on publicly owned land should accrue royalties to the owners of the land as well.  There 
are other specific criticisms that can be leveled but they will generally fall into the categories of 
either environmental and land use issues or fiscal issues.  We will briefly look at the first class of 
issues; specifically, that the General Mining Law of 1872 lacks provisions for environmental 
protection and that the law gives mining uses priority over all other potential uses of federal 
lands.  However, this main focus of this paper is on the fiscal issues relating to federal royalties.  
We argue that the arguments in favor of federal royalties ignore the actual constellation of 
property rights in western states, fail to take into account the current state and local tax systems 
in the west, and disregard the likely producer response to the imposition of a royalty.  These 
factors, when combined with the underlying economics of the industry, imply that a royalty will 
have a much smaller than anticipated effect in terms of revenue generation and may reduce the 
efficiency of the mining industry in the west.  
The claims that the 1872 General Mining Law lack environmental protection provisions 
are true; however this criticism is misplaced as other laws have been passed that do address 
possible degradation of natural and cultural resources.  The 1872 General Mining Law simply 
defines the process by which individuals can acquire and maintain property rights in mineral 
resources on federally owned land; as possible environmental degradation would occur as a 
                                                 
3 Woods, Neal D.  “Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-




result of the extraction of a resource, rather than the mere ownership of the right to extract said 
resource, there is no compelling reason that both issues need to be addressed in the same law.     
  More generally, the criticism that the 1872 General Mining Law gives land use priority to 
mining uses of federal lands ignores the fact that the law has been amended and augmented 
numerous times by numerous federal statutes (see, for example, the Federal Land Policy Act of 
1976, the Antiquities Act, the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, etc.) and federal 
rule making pursuant to these acts, principally CFR 43 3809.  It is still true that, a priori, mining 
is presumed to be the highest valued use of public lands.  From the standpoint of marketable 
value produced per acre disturbed, this is clearly true; a gold mine produces far more revenue per 
acre disturbed than grazing cattle, wildlife habitat, wind farming, or cutting trees.  A sticking 
point in this argument, of course, is the non-use value of the land, i.e., the value of leaving the 
land undisturbed.
4  This invariably brings the debate outside the realm of “pure” economics; 
critiques based on non-use value of land typically question the underlying assumption of 
economic value trumping aesthetics or religion, especially with respect to Native American tribal 
religions.  Nonetheless, there is a significant permitting process that puts the presumption that 
whichever land use maximizes economic value is the best use of a particular piece of land to 
serious and open public scrutiny.  While such processes may be imperfect, they nonetheless 
undermine the statutory primacy of mining claims by allowing non-economic issues, such as 
aesthetic or religious concerns, to potentially outweigh purely economic value maximization on a 
case-by-case basis. 
  The criticism that there is no provision for federal royalties in the General Mining Law is 
the concern upon which this paper will primarily focus.  As with the concerns mentioned above, 
                                                 
4 Cummings, Ronald G., Brookshire, David S., and Schulze, William D., Eds., Valuing Environmental Goods, 
Rowan and Allanheld, 1986.  
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the general premise is also correct insofar as there are no federal royalties on minerals covered 
under the General Mining Law, but requires further examination.  It should first be noted that the 
issue over potential federal hardrock mineral royalties is largely symbolic.  Nationwide, mining 
is a relatively small industry.  In 2007 the Congressional Budget Office estimated the value of 
hardrock minerals removed from federal lands to be approximately $1.0 billion.  At the proposed 
Obama royalty rate of 5%, this amounts to approximately $50 million in revenue.  Thus, the 
revenue that a royalty would raise is relatively minor, particularly in the context of a $3.9 trillion 
annual federal budget.  Moreover, as we argue below, it would be untenable to enact royalties on 
already claimed deposits, so any revenues will only be generated from currently unclaimed ore 
bodies and thus are unlikely to be realized for years, if not decades.  Symbolic issues aside, the 
imposition of a royalty upon hardrock mining would have a negligible effect on total government 
(combined federal and state) revenues derived from mining activity, as a federal royalty would 
likely “crowd out” state and local levies.   
  The 1872 Mining Law settled a significant problem in its day—the issue of extralateral 
claims.  These are claims located next to a known deposit and/or operating mine.  The owner(s) 
of the extralateral claims would wait until they believed that a miner crossed the boundary line 
between their claims, and then sued.  Contemporary accounts suggest that these lawsuits 
virtually shut down mining on the Comstock Lode in Nevada where Nevada’s future Senator 
William Stewart was a successful mining attorney. When he got to the Senate, Stewart sponsored 
a mining law in 1866 and sponsored a second law in 1872 to clear up the issue of title to  
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subsurface mineral rights, i.e., invalidate extralateral claims.  Extralateral claims were only valid 
if their owner diligently tried to develop them.
5 
The majority of mines that would be impacted by reforming the Mining Law of 1872 
engage in so-called “hardrock” mining (as opposed to “softrock” mining, i.e., coal mining, other 
fuel minerals like oil and gas, and “common variety” minerals like aggregate and industrial 
minerals e.g., lime, gypsum, clay).  Hardrock minerals are defined here to include non-ferrous 
metals such as copper, gold, silver, platinum group metals, molybdenum, lithium, etc.  These 
minerals are generally referred to as “locatable” minerals under 30 U.S.C.A. § 22 in that they can 
be located and claimed following the general guidelines of the General Mining Law of 1872.  So 
called “common variety” minerals, such as sand, gravel, coal, oil, and gas, are considered 
“leasable” under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.
6  One simple distinction between locatable 
and leasable minerals is that the former are harder to find, and because of this, the discoverer is 
rewarded for their discovery with ownership.  Such an arrangement would tend to encourage 
economic efficiency, as prospectors for harder-to-find minerals will require higher potential 
rewards to compensate for the risk involved. Another important distinction between hardrock 
minerals and both common variety minerals and fuel minerals is that the latter are generally 
usable commodities at the point of extraction: the quarry, the mine mouth, or the well-head.  
Hardrock mineral ores usually require significant beneficiation, or processing, after extraction. 
  Proponents of federal mining royalties typically attempt to draw a comparison between 
leasable and locatable minerals.  However, there are geological problems with this comparison, 
which is why the distinction between leasable and locatable minerals was made in the first place.  
                                                 
5 Smith, Grant H., The History of the Comstock Lode, Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology, University of Nevada 
Press, 1943. 
6 30 U.S.C.A. Section 201(b).  
8 
 
Leasable minerals like gravel, oil, natural gas, coal, etc., are generally found in horizontal 
geological structures, like river beds with aggregate, or coal fields, where if one finds a leasable 
mineral in one place, it is very likely that more of it can be found nearby.  Oil and natural gas 
deposits are similar; if one of these commodities is found at one location, it is likely to be found 
in a mile (or more) in any direction.
7   
Conversely, locatable minerals have historically been found in vertical geological 
structures, i.e., veins or faults in the earth’s crust that hosted veins or hydrological structures 
(e.g., hot springs).
8  Modern mineral exploration and processing techniques, as well as 
economics (principally, higher prices) have made it possible to locate and process ore from 
larger, more disseminated geological structures.  However, the fact remains that locatable 
minerals are much more difficult to locate than leasable or common variety, minerals.  In short, 
these geological and economic factors indicate that there is unlikely to a be a one-size-fits-all 
answer to the issue of mining taxation, and that the taxes and regulations that work for hardrock 
mining are unlikely to be identical to those that work for other types of minerals.   
  The call for a federal royalty also ignores the basic definition of a royalty, which is a 
payment to the owner of a valuable resource whether it is a mineral, a patent, a copyright, etc.  
When a locatable mineral is found on public land, the discoverer stakes and records a claim and, 
if done properly, ownership of the mineral is conveyed from the federal government to the 
discoverer.  In other cases the federal government may have conveyed title to another private 
landowner through, for example, one of the Homestead Acts; in such an instance, a mining 
                                                 
7 Coggins, George Cameron, and Wilkinson, Charles F., “Federal; Public Land and Resources Law”, Mineola, NY, 
The Foundation Press, 1981, note that there is little reason to reward “discovery” of these kinds of minerals with 
ownership since their location is generally local common knowledge, pp. 396 – 400. 
8 Lacy, Willard, “An Introduction to Geology and Hard Rock Mining,” Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 
Science and Technology Series, http://www.rmmlf.org/scitech/lacy/lacy.htm, ch. 4.  Coggins and Wilkinson, op. cit. 
at 7, emphasize the importance of the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit at length, pp. 344 – 351.  
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company could obtain permission from the landowner to explore and lease the mineral rights 
with the promise of a royalty if production occurs.  The thrust of reform efforts on this issue is to 
convert the mining claim system to one in which the federal government would retain ownership 
of mineral rights, like it currently does for leasable minerals.  The federal government cannot, 
however, receive a “royalty” on property that it does not own, and the federal government no 
longer owns the mineral rights to previously claimed discoveries.  There have been discussions 
about “clawing back” the minerals rights already conveyed—for example the Hardrock Mining 
and Reclamation Act of 2007 included a 4% royalty for extant mines with operations permits—
but this would clearly be challenged as a taking of private property, as the property rights have 
already been conveyed.  As a result, the discussion of moving to a leasing system is therefore 
only plausible within the context of future mining claims.  Furthermore, the argument that a 
royalty on future claims would increase government revenues needs to be considered within 
context of existing government revenues accruing from private mining operations.  Governments 
at the federal, state, and local level are currently taxing individuals and corporations engaged in 
mining; while the federal government only taxes income, state and local governments utilize a 
variety of methods of taxation, including income taxes, property taxes and sales and use taxes.  
We argue that a federal royalty would to a large extent “crowd out” some of the currently extant 
state and local taxes—revenues would simply shift from state and local governments to the 
federal government.  To address this, we turn to a discussion of the current state of mineral 
taxation at the state level. 
 
Western State Hardrock Mining Tax Comparisons  
10 
 
We have attempted to put together a meaningful comparison of state mining taxes for 
non-ferrous metal mining in the U.S.  This task is not as simple as proponents of royalties and 
taxes have claimed; a coalition of environmental lobbying groups (Earthworks, the Mineral 
Policy Center, and the Sierra Club) put together a “white paper”
9 which claimed that all western 
states producing hardrock minerals except Nevada and Alaska employ a gross proceeds tax 
(which is analogous to a gross royalty).  On closer inspection of state statutes regarding taxation 
of mines, we find this claim to be untrue.  All but one western state employs some version of a 
Net Proceeds Tax; although they may refer to a tax as a “gross” tax, typically, they allow 
deduction of certain costs of production. 
Comparing state taxation of metal mining has difficulties that go beyond the use of 
terminology like “net” and “gross”.  Each state produces a different mix of minerals which, in 
some cases, they tax differently.  For example, in Colorado, molybdenum is taxed differently 
than other metals.  In Utah, beryllium is taxed differently than copper.  Each state tends to adapt 
the tax laws to the economics of the particular mineral produced and the size of the operations in 
their states.
10  Nevada and Alaska, on the other hand, take more of a “one size fits all” approach 
to mineral taxation.  Gold miners are subject to the same set of statutes and regulations as copper 
miners, molybdenum miners, geothermal producers, etc.  Small producers are given a reduction 
in tax rates
11, but other than that, all mineral producers are treated alike.  
Further confounding the comparison of the tax treatment of mineral producers among 
states is the role of other, non-mineral related taxes, in determining the overall tax burden of a 
                                                 
9 “A Hardrock Mining Royalty: Case Studies and Industry Norms, Earthworks, Washington, D.C., 
http://www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/AHardrockRoyalty.pdf.  Also see “The Rahall-Shays-Inslee Mining Reform 
Bill”, Mineral Policy Center, Washington, D.C., 2003, 
http://www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/MPCfs_2003ReformBill.pdf . 
10 See appendix I 
11 NRS 362.140 provides for a reduced tax rate for operations with net proceeds less than $4 million.  
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mining operation.  All states have property taxes on property, plant, and equipment, but rates 
vary.  Most states have corporate income taxes and/or sales and use taxes, and the rates vary 
among states, and in some cases, local jurisdictions within states. 
In an effort to address these difficulties, we have taken a hypothetical medium sized gold 
mine that would be fairly typical of an operation found in Nevada and calculated its tax liabilities 
if that mine were in various other states.  The hypothetical mine produces 250,000 ounces of 
gold per year which it sells for $1,100 per ounce for gross revenue of $275 million.  It employs 
350 workers with labor costs including benefits and taxes of $36.4 million.  Net operating profits 
are assumed to be $50 million per year.  The tables below show mining specific taxes and total 
taxes (including mining taxes) in 10 western states.  For types of taxes that would vary within 
states (i.e. property taxes), the statewide average tax rate was used.  With few exceptions, the 
total tax burden does not vary much between states even though mining specific taxes vary 
significantly.  The total tax bill for this hypothetical mine is roughly 20%-30% of net operating 
profits in each state. Some states like California and New Mexico have relatively low mining 
specific taxes but are still comparable to other states because of other taxes such as general 
property, sales and use, and corporate income taxes. The Tables 1 and 2 show rankings by total 
tax and mining tax burdens. 
<Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here> 
The results for the two states with the highest mining-specific taxes, Montana and 
Wyoming, are somewhat misleading.  In the case of Montana, the state has adopted a relatively 
negative attitude toward mining in the past decades.  Part of this is due to the legacy of mining in 
the state and its negative perception.  In fact, the hypothetical mine used for this example could 
not be built in Montana because Montana bans the use of cyanide heap leach processing.   
12 
 
Consequently, it is doubtful that any Montana mine would exist to actually pay the amount 
shown.  If someone discovered a gold deposit in Montana they would likely concentrate the ore 
to increase the grade of the material, and then ship it out of state for final processing.  We have 
included Montana using the same financial model anyway for reasons of comparability. 
The case of Wyoming is slightly different.  The major mining products in Wyoming are 
coal, uranium, and trona.  These products are typically sold at the mouth of the mine without 
significant processing and, hence, without the operator incurring significant costs.  The 
hypothetical mine model used for this exercise anticipates significant processing and costs after 
the mined material leaves the mine mouth to maintain the comparability of the results; while 
these costs are tax deductable in other states, they are not in Wyoming.  If the gold deposit that 
the hypothetical mine is based on actually existed in Wyoming the operators would no doubt 
adapt to the tax regime.  This would be done by selling the ore at the mine mouth without 
processing to avoid being taxed on the value added to the product from processing.  
Consequently, if we discount the results for Montana and Wyoming for the reasons 
above, as a practical matter this leaves Alaska and Nevada as the states with the highest mining-
specific taxes for this hypothetical mine.  States with the lowest mining-specific tax burdens, 
California and New Mexico, nonetheless rank in the upper half of the states considered in terms 
of total taxes paid because of their reliance on general business and other taxes like corporate 
income taxes, general property taxes on property, plant and equipment, sales taxes, and other 
levies.  Table 3 summarizes the current state of mineral taxation in each of these states, and a 
more detailed treatment can be found in the Appendix. 
<Insert Table 3 about here>  
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While the total state tax bill for our hypothetical mine is typically between 20% and 30% 
of net operating profit, what is more important is that the specific composition of the tax varies 
considerably from state to state.  This observation is suggestive of the counterintuitive result that 
enacting a federal hardrock royalty may have little to no effect on the total tax bill a mine would 
have to pay, as such a royalty would simply force state governments to reduce state taxes paid by 
each mining company.  While counterintuitive, this argument is based on the logics of fiscal 
federalism and fiscal decentralization.   For any given mining endeavor, the government can 
view the taxable income as fixed and must choose a level of taxes that maximizes government 
revenue while generating enough profits to keep the mine in business and encouraging 
exploration by prospective miners.   Once this level of taxation is determined by the government, 
the specific form that these taxes take is essentially zero-sum.  Increases in one form of taxation 
must be offset by decreases in another; assuming the government has already determined the 
optimal level of taxation, failure to offset increases in this manner will ultimately risk lost future 
revenues due to mining capital flowing to other industries or reduced future exploration.
 12    
It is likely that in the roughly 150 years of mining in these western states that the 
negotiation between state governments and mining interests have identified and are near the 
optimal level of taxation.  As a result, state tax officials will view the added federal royalty as 
pushing the total government revenues from mining above the optimal level.  It is thus likely that 
a federal royalty would ultimately be offset by reductions in state taxes and that such a royalty 
would crowd out at least some state revenues. 
The typical argument against the fiscal federalism/fiscal decentralization position is that 
competition among states will result in a “race to the bottom.”  One with this perspective would 
                                                 
12 Otto, James M.  2001.  “Fiscal Decentralization and Mining Taxation.”   The World Bank Group Mining 
Department (unpub)  
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argue that states will have chosen a level of taxation that is less than optimal, for fear that 
otherwise mining companies will choose to operate in different jurisdictions; state governments 
are forced to “leave money on the table” when determining how much to tax mines (though this 
argument applies to any business endeavor, not just mining) out of concern that the company will 
flee to a neighboring, more favorable, jurisdiction.  The potential for this to occur would justify 
the harmonization (if not centralization) of taxation as a means of avoiding this form of 
competition.  This argument only has merit in the case of processing as the race to the bottom 
argument is dependent upon the ability of firms/operations to relocate.  While the capital and 
mining expertise are mobile, the mines themselves are inherently immobile.  If a neighboring 
state or a foreign country has a more favorable set of regulations or taxes, there is little a mining 
company can do as the ore body has a fixed location.  In some cases it is economically feasible to 
ship unprocessed ore hundreds of miles for processing, and concentrated ores are shipped around 
the globe for refinement—this is commonly done now to take advantage of more efficient 
refining technologies at other locations—but this is an industrial process, not a mining process.   
The fact that mining is in fact two separate processes—extraction and refining—further 
reduces the ability of a royalty of the sort recently proposed to Congress (gross royalty) to 
generate funds for the federal government.  Mining companies will seek to minimize the value of 
the tax base at the time of the taxable event.  For the gross royalty included in the Rahall bill, the 
taxable event occurs when the mining company sells their output to the market.  This could 
either be a completely refined metal, a concentrated ore, or an unprocessed ore.  Currently, most 
hardrock mining companies do the majority of their refining “in-house,” often at facilities at the 
mine location though, as mentioned above, shipping ore to other company-owned refining 
locations is not uncommon.  As a result, the mining company is typically selling a refined  
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product (i.e. nearly “pure” gold or silver, or doré) to the market.  If a gross royalty is imposed, a 
mining company would have to pay a royalty based on the price they receive for the refined 
product, likely the market spot price.  However, this royalty will create a strong incentive for 
mining companies to become less vertically integrated; they are likely to separate their extraction 
and refining processes into two separate companies, and sell unprocessed ores at the minemouth 
to their related refining company.  This will reduce the tax base at the time of the taxable event, 
as an unprocessed ore will sell for significantly less than a refined metal, and refiners would not 
be subject to paying a royalty on the incremental value added from the refining process. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications  
  The nature of property rights in the west is highly fragmented; it is possible that one party 
could own surface rights, another party might own mineral rights, while a third party owns water 
rights to the same piece of property.   Situations such as these have historically created multiple 
local stakeholders at odds with one another.  In recent decades groups with political clout at the 
federal level, such as environmental lobbies, have entered the fray, moving these land use battles 
out of the statehouses and on to Capitol Hill.  This move has caused political commentators to 
lose sight of the purpose and function of the fragmentation of rights.  In isolation, the laws and 
institutions that have generated the current state of western property rights, particularly with 
regard to locatable mineral rights, seem to be antiquated and at odds with the laws regarding 
other sorts of mineral rights.  It is not surprising, then, that stakeholders at odds with mining 
interests are rallying around this seeming incongruity as a means by which they can claim that 
their concerns are motivated by advancing the public interest.    
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  It is against this backdrop that we have tried to shed light on two separate, but related 
topics: the 1872 Mining Law controversy and state taxation of hardrock minerals.  As mentioned 
above, federal land law in general has created a complex system of property rights.  In our view, 
this dysfunctional land/resource holding system has created an unrealistic debate about federal 
royalties on mineral resources.  While all other countries consider minerals as “national 
patrimony” and state property, the U.S. legal tradition has always considered locatable minerals 
as private property.  In the eastern U.S. these minerals generally belong to the owners of the 
surface who own the land in “fee simple title”.  In the western U.S. some land is owned in “fee” 
with mineral rights, but a majority of the land in the inter-mountain west, i.e., between the Rocky 
and the Sierra Nevada mountains, is owned by the federal government.  Mineral rights to these 
lands are owned by private claimants.
13  By definition, the federal government cannot collect a 
royalty on what it does not own.  As a result, if the mining law were reformed the federal 
government could collect royalties on future discoveries, but with respect to already claimed 
mineral rights all the federal government can do is collect an income tax, which it already does. 
To go further and attempt to enact a royalty on already claimed rights would almost certainly be 
contested as a violation of the constitutional takings clause.   
  Moreover, we have argued that moving from the claim-based system embodied in the 
1872 Mining Law to a royalty based system, such as the system that applies to leasable minerals, 
would represent a fundamental change in the property rights regime that would have adverse 
efficiency effects and negligible fiscal effects.  The current policy discussion is focused squarely 
on federal royalties on minerals produced on federal lands and does not adequately account for 
the interaction between these proposed federal royalties and the current state of taxation at lower 
                                                 
13 Coggins and Wilkinson, Op. cit. at 7.  
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levels of government.  The mining industry contributes to state tax revenue in amounts that 
appear to be consistent with other industries and the specific economics of producing different 
minerals.  State legislatures have recognized both the benefits of production and nuances of 
production processes.  In short, states adapt their taxation of minerals to the nature of the 
hardrock mining industry in their states.  Likewise, hardrock miners adapt their operating 
procedures to the tax regime in the state where the minerals are located. This process will 
generate an equilibrium level of taxation that should be similar across states.  Although state tax 
systems may look quite different in terms of mining specific and general business taxes, when 
we do an “apples to apples” comparison of a hypothetical gold mine which has the same taxable 
property value in every state, the overall tax burden varies very little.  The imposition of a 
royalty should have little effect on the equilibrium level of government revenue accruing from 
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State    Mining Tax  Other Tax  Total Tax 
Colorado    $2,880,000   $12,660,430   $15,540,430  
California    $534,209   $13,239,688   $13,773,897  
Montana    $7,460,750   $5,614,700   $13,075,450  
Utah    $2,145,000   $10,434,807   $12,579,807  
Nevada    $3,187,500   $8,500,000   $11,687,500  
New Mexico  $11,070,250   $10,795,250   $275,000  
Arizona    $1,250,000   $9,183,503   $10,433,503  
Alaska    $3,497,000   $6,496,040   $9,993,040  
Wyoming    $6,307,000   $2,200,000   $8,507,000  











State  Type of Tax  Mining Tax   Prop. Tax
i  Corp Tax  Other Taxes 
Alaska 
AS 43.65, 15 AAC 065; AS 
38.05, 11 ASC 86.221 
Mining license tax, 
production royalty, 
property tax 









A.R.S.  § 42-5201-5202 
Severance tax on metalliferous 
minerals 
2.5% of net severance base  Varies by 
Locality 
6.968%   
California 
California Revenue and Tax 
Code, § 104 et seq. 
Mining discounted cash flow tax 
Corporate income and other normal 
bus. taxes apply. 
1% of full discounted cash flow  1%
iii  10.84%   
Colorado 
C.A.R.S.  § 39-29-102 et seq. 
Severance tax on metallic minerals 
and most fuel minerals 
Taxes specific to each mineral type
iv  Varies by 
Locality 
4.63%   
Idaho 
I.C.  § 47-1201, et seq. 
License tax on net value of ores 
mined 
Net proceeds rate of 1%
v  Varies by 
Locality 
7.6%   
Montana 
MCA  § 15-6-131; 15-6-132; 15-
23-501; 15-23-801; 15-37-101; 
15-37-201; and 15-38-104 
Net proceeds of mines and mining 
claims 






6.75%   
Nevada 
NRS chapters 360-377 
Net Proceeds of Minerals Tax  5%, reduced rate for small producers, tax based on 
gross proceeds of minerals less costs of extraction, 





N/A  Modified payroll 
tax, Sales and 
Use taxes by 
county 
New Mexico 
N.M.S.A.  Chapter 7, Art. 25, 
Resources Excise Tax Act; 
Chapter 7, Art. 26, Severance Tax 
Act. 
Severance tax on metalliferous and 
non-metalliferous minerals 
Resource and processor’s tax: Potash = 0.50%; 
molybdenum = 0.125%; all others = 0.75%; and 
Severance tax: varied bases for gross value of 
minerals with tax rates ranging from 0.20% to 2 ½ 








U.C.A, Title 59, Chapter 5, 
Severance Tax on Oil, Gas, and 
Mining; U.C.A.  § 59-6-102 
 
Severance tax on metalliferous 
mines, oil, gas, other hydrocarbonic 
substances. 
Conservation tax: 0.20% of value at the well for oil, 
gas, natural gas; and Severance tax: 2.6% of taxable 
value of metals with exemption for first $50,000 of 
gross value per mine; and 3% to 5% of value of oil 




5%   
Wyoming 
Wyoming Constitution, Art. 15,  §  
19; Title 39, Chapter 14, Mine 
Product Taxes 
Severance tax on coal, crude oil, 
natural gas, bentonite, trona, sand, 
gravel, uranium, and other “valuable 
deposits.”  Ad valorem production 
tax  on mine mouth value. 
Severance tax rate varies by commodity, ranging 
from 7% for surface coal to 2% for other “valuable 
deposits.” Constitution has additional 1.5% tax on 













Type of Tax: Mining License Tax & Production Royalty & Property Tax & Direct 
infrastructure cost.  
 
Tax Rate: MLT is 7% of Net - applies to all commodities (base coal, metals, precious 
metals, industrial minerals) on all lands - federal, state, private, including Native 
Corporation lands.   
 
Property Tax:  Determined by local Borough (county).  
 
Mining Claim Rental (tax):  Years 0-5 @ $0.66/ac; 6-10 @ $1.32/ac; 11+ @ $3.30/ac.  
 
Production Royalty:  (everything except coal) 3% of Net - (same basis as MLT) applies 
to State-owned lands. 
 
Alaska Corporate Income Tax:  9% for all industries.   
 
Infrastructure: Airfields, roads, ports, power, power transmission lines, etc. all paid by 
the miner as there are so few roads or other infrastructure.   
 




Type of Tax:  Severance tax on metalliferous minerals (copper, gold, silver, 
molybdenum, or substances containing such metals). 
   
Tax Rate:  Net severance base multiplied by 2.5%. 
 
Notes:  Tax is in lieu of other taxes on mining.  Corporate income and property taxes 
imposed on mining. 
 




Type of Tax: Property tax on the present value of discounted cash flows from operations. 
 
Tax Rate:  1% of full discounted cash flow. 
 
Notes: Property, plant and equipment are subject to normal property taxes at a 1% rate.  
Corporate income and other normal business taxes apply. 
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Type of Tax:  Severance tax on metallic minerals; molybdenum ore; crude oil, natural 
gas, carbon dioxide, oil, gas; coal; and oil shale. 
   
Tax Rate:  Metallics: taxable years after 1999 = 2.25% on gross income over $19 million; 
Molybdenum: 5 cents per ton over 625,000 tons per quarter;  Oil, gas, etc.: sliding scale 
from 2% on gross income under $25,000 to 5% on gross income over $300,00;  Coal: 36 
cents per ton over 300,000 tons per quarter; and Oil shale: 1% for first year and increases 
1% each year until 4% rate reached. 
 
Notes:  Gross income defined as “net amount realized by taxpayer”; oil and gas taxes 
allow 87.5% credit for property taxes; stripper wells are exempt; and coal and metals 
allow credits up to 50%. 
 
Corporate income and property taxes are also imposed. 
 





Type of Tax:  License tax on net value of ores mined. 
   
Tax Rate:  Net proceeds rate of 1%. 
 
Notes:  Sand, gravel, and substances which are gaseous or liquid in natural state (e.g. oil, 
gas) are excluded. 
 
Corporate income and property taxes also imposed on mining. 
 




Type of Tax:  Net proceeds of mines and mining claims. 
 
  (No net proceeds the tax is at the local ad valorem rate.) 
   
Tax Rate:  Taxed as personal property by classification; Class one is all mines except 
bentonite, coal, and metal mines, at 100% of annual proceeds with deductions allowed 
based on mineral; and Class two is metal mines at 3% of annual gross proceeds. 
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Notes:  Also imposed a license tax on metalliferous and micaceous mines as a percentage 
(1.6% to 1.81%) of gross value.  Gross value under $250,000 is exempt but 0.5% 
Resource Indemnity and Groundwater Assessment Tax applies. 
 
Coal, oil, and gas are taxed differently. 
 
Corporate income and property taxes also imposed on mining. 
 





Type of Tax:  Net Proceeds of Minerals Tax of 5% of gross proceeds from the sale of all 
minerals (excluding sand and gravel) less costs of extraction, processing, transportation, 
marketing, depreciation of property, plant and equipment, and all associated labor costs. 
 
Tax Rate: 5% with a reduced rate for small producers. 
 
Other taxes: Modified Business Tax – a payroll tax of .05 % with deductions for 
employee health care benefits. 
 
Sales and Use taxes vary by county and special districts. 
 
Ad Valorem Property Taxes rates vary by county and special districts but statutorily 
capped at 3.64 % of 35 % of market value. 
 
Citation: NRS chapter 362 for Net Proceeds, chapter 361 for property taxes, and chapters 




Type of Tax:  Severance tax on metalliferous and non-metalliferous minerals. 
   
Tax Rate:  Resource and processor’s tax: Potash = 0.50%; molybdenum = 0.125%; all 
others = 0.75%; and Severance tax: varied bases for gross value of minerals with tax rates 
ranging from 0.20% to 2 ½ % and coals rates per short ton from 55 to 60 cents. 
 
Notes:  Oil, natural gas, liquid hydrocarbon, helium, or carbon dioxide are excluded. 
 
Oil and gas are taxed differently. 
 
Corporate income and property taxes also imposed on mining. 
 
Citation:  N.M.S.A.  Chapter 7, Art. 25, Resources Excise Tax Act; Chapter 7, Art. 26, 
Severance Tax Act.  




Type of Tax:  Severance tax on metalliferous mines, oil, gas, other hydrocarbonic 
substances. 
   
Tax Rate:  Conservation tax: 0.20% of value at the well for oil, gas, natural gas; and 
Severance tax: 2.6% of taxable value of metals with exemption for first $50,000 of gross 
value per mine; and 3% to 5% of value of oil and gas at the well. 
 
Notes:  Oil or gas derived from coals-to-liquid technology, shale, or tar sand are exempt; 
sand and gravel, gems, potash, gypsum, sulfur, and others are excluded; and taxable value 
varies for beryllium and for minerals shipped out of state as ore. 
 
Corporate franchise (income) and property taxes also imposed on mining. 
 





Type of Tax:  Severance tax on coal, crude oil, natural gas, bentonite, trona, sand, gravel, 
uranium, and other “valuable deposits.” 
   
Tax Rate:   
  Surface Coal – 7% 
  Underground Coal – 3.75% 
  Crude Oil/Natural Gas – 6% 
  Trona – 4% 
  Bentonite – 2% 
  Sand and Gravel – 2% 
  Uranium – 4% 
  Other “Valuable Deposits” – 2% 
 
Notes:  State constitution has 1 ½ % tax on value of gross product of coal, petroleum, 
natural gas, oil shale, and other minerals; and state legislature may designate other 
minerals and impose additional taxes. 
 
No state corporate income tax. 
 
Ad valorem production tax on 100% of value at mouth of mine at local tax rate; ad 
valorem tax on real/personal property at 11.5% assessment ratio at local tax rate; and 
state royalties on bentonite (55 to 60 cents per ton), coal (8 to 12.5%), trona (6%), and 
uranium (5%). 
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i Property tax rates in most instances will vary by locality (county, city, etc).  In cases where property taxes 
are treated specially this is noted. 
ii Additionally, there is very little infrastructure in Alaska (roads, power, etc) so most of this is produced 
directly by miners which is an additional cost. 
iii Property tax includes property, plant, and equipment. 
iv Metallics in taxable years after 1999: 2.25% on gross income over $19 million; Molybdenum: 5 cents per 
ton over 625,000 tons per quarter;  Oil, gas, etc.: sliding scale from 2% on gross income under $25,000 to 
5% on gross income over $300,000;  Coal: 36 cents per ton over 300,000 tons per quarter; and Oil shale: 
1% for first year and increases increases 1% each year until 4% rate reached.  Gross income defined as “net 
amount realized by taxpayer”; oil and gas taxes allow 87.5% credit for property taxes; stripper wells are 
exempt; and coal and metals allow credits up to 50%. 
v Sand, gravel, and substances which are gaseous or liquid in natural state (e.g. oil, gas) are excluded. 
vi Class one is all mines except bentonite, coal, and metal mines, at 100% of annual proceeds with 
deductions allowed based on mineral; and Class two is metal mines at 3% of annual gross proceeds. Coal, 
oil, and gas are taxed differently. Also imposed a license tax on metalliferous and micaceous mines as a 
percentage (1.6% to 1.81%) of gross value.  Gross value under $250,000 is exempt but 0.5% Resource 
Indemnity and Groundwater Assessment Tax applies. 
vii Ad Valorem Property Taxes rates vary by county and special districts but statutorily capped at 3.64 % of 
35 % of market value 
viii Oil, natural gas, liquid hydrocarbon, helium, and carbon dioxide are excluded.  Oil and gas are taxed 
differently. 
ix Oil or gas derived from coals-to-liquid technology, shale, or tar sand are exempt; sand and gravel, gems, 
potash, gypsum, sulfur, and others are excluded; and taxable value varies for beryllium and for minerals 
shipped out of state as ore 
x Ad valorem tax on real/personal property at 11.5% assessment ratio at local tax rate 
 